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Introduction 
 
The paper is concerned with the types of arguments that can be found in the 
argumentative discourse on an ethical issue such as abortion. The theoretical 
framework I use is the pragma-dialectical theory of argumentation (van Eemeren 
and Grootendorst 2004) which combines rhetoric and dialectics with a pragmatic 
approach to communication. I start from the premise that an ethical debate on 
abortion may be considered a critical discussion meant to resolve differences of 
opinion through a process of argumentation. According to the relevance rule for 
critical discussion standpoints should be defended by rational arguments (logos) and 
not by rhetorical devices such as ethos and pathos or by irrelevant arguments. In 
addition to rational arguments in the ethical argumentation on abortion opponents 
make use of ethos and pathos to justify or refute a certain standpoint: abortion is / is 
not a crime.  
From a discourse theory perspective (Kinneavy 1971) we may view the ethical 
discourse on abortion as a type of persuasive discourse in which the participants try 
to win the argument in their favor. The main function of this type of Řpersonř 
discourse is to produce some effect on the decoder. In order to reach this goal, 
participants make use of different methods of persuasion: rational arguments, 
arguments from authority (character) or emotional arguments. According to Corbett 
(1971) there are three kinds of persuasive discourse Ŕ deliberative, judicial and 
ceremonial Ŕ each of them with its own special topics or lines of argument. From this 
perspective the ethical discourse on abortion can be considered as a type of 
deliberative discourse. The special topics we expect to find in such a discourse and, 
therefore, in the ethical argumentation on abortion are: Ŗthe worthy or the good and 
the advantageous or expedient or usefulŗ (Corbett 1971: 146). 
These aspects will be analyzed with reference to argumentative texts on abortion 
in an attempt to see whether in defending their positions the discussants maintain a 
balance between reasonableness and persuasion. In pragma-dialectical terms if 
greater emphasis is put on rhetorical devices rather than on rational arguments, 
fallacies may occur.  
The paper is divided into two parts. The first part is a brief presentation of the 
theoretical framework including the pragma-dialectical approach to argumentation 
as well as Kinneavyřs approach to persuasive discourse and Corbettřs special topics 
for deliberative discourse. The second part focuses on the dialectical and rhetorical 
aspects of two fragments of argumentative texts on abortion.    
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1. Theoretical framework 
 
The pragma-dialectical approach (van Eemeren & Grootendorst 1987, 1992, 2004) is 
a theory which integrates rhetoric and dialectics with a pragmatic approach to 
communication. The dialectical dimension of the theory consists in the dialogue or 
interaction between two parties that try to reach consensus. The rhetorical 
dimension resides in convincing a critical opponent of the acceptability of a 
standpoint by means of effective persuasive techniques. The pragmatic dimension 
resides in viewing argumentation as a complex speech act which contributes to the 
resolution of a difference of opinion.  
Pragma-dialectics defines argumentation as Ŗa verbal, social, and rational 
activity aimed at convincing a reasonable critic of the acceptability of a standpoint 
by putting forward a constellation of propositions justifying or refuting the 
proposition expressed in the standpointŗ  (van Eemeren and Grootendorst 2004: 1). 
Therefore, argumentation is viewed as a means of resolving differences of opinion by 
testing contested standpoints in a process of critical discussion. In an argumentative 
process the participants have to pursue two goals: one the one hand to resolve the 
dispute in a reasonable way and on the other hand to win the argument in their 
favour by means of persuasion. To put it simply, they have to maintain a balance 
between their dialectical and rhetorical aims. According to van Eemeren and 
Houtlosser (2002) discussants in a dispute are engaged in a form of strategic 
maneuvering which combines the best choice of arguments with the adaptation to 
the audience demand and with the most appropriate rhetorical devices in defending 
or refuting a standpoint. A problem arises, however, when a partyřs aim of 
persuading the opponent overrules its commitment to reasonableness. At that point 
Ŗthe strategic maneuvering has got Řderailedř and is condemnable of being fallaciousŗ 
(van Eemeren & Houtlosser 2002: 142).   
There are four stages of a critical discussion: confrontation, opening, 
argumentation and conclusion. The protagonist and the antagonist Ŕ the two 
opposing parties in the dispute Ŕ are supposed to be reasonable discussants that are 
prepared to follow the ten rules for critical discussion proposed by pragma-dialectics 
in order to resolve their conflict of opinion. The ten commandments for reasonable 
discussants Ŗlist prohibitions of moves in an argumentative discourse or text that 
hinder or obstruct the resolution of a difference of opinionŗ (van Eemeren and 
Grootendorst 2004: 190). 
Discussants may not prevent each other from advancing standpoints or from calling 
standpoints into question. (Řfreedom ruleř) 
Discussants who advance a standpoint may not refuse to defend this standpoint when 
requested to do so. (Řobligation-to-defend ruleř) 
Attacks on standpoints may not bear on a standpoint that has not actually been put 
forward by the other party. (Řstandpoint ruleř) 
Standpoints may not be defended by non-argumentation that is not relevant to the 
standpoint. (Řrelevance ruleř) 
Discussants may not falsely attribute unexpressed premises to the other party, nor disown 
responsibility for their own unexpressed premises. (Řunexpressed-premise ruleř) 
Discussants may not falsely present something as an accepted starting point or falsely 
deny that something is an accepted starting point. (Řstarting-point ruleř) 
Reasoning that in an argumentation is presented as formally conclusive may not be invalid 
in a logical sense. (Řvalidity ruleř) 
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Standpoints may not be regarded as conclusively defended by argumentation that is not 
presented as based on formally conclusive reasoning if the defense does not take place by 
means of appropriate argument schemes that are applied correctly. (Řargument scheme 
ruleř) 
Inconclusive defenses of standpoints may not lead to maintaining these standpoints, and 
conclusive defenses of standpoints may not lead to maintaining expressions of doubt 
concerning these standpoints. (Řconcluding ruleř) 
Discussants may not use any formulations that are insufficiently clear or confusingly 
ambiguous, and they may not deliberately misinterpret the other partyřs formulations. 
(Řlanguage use ruleř)  
(van Eemeren & Grootendorst 2004: 190-195). 
On the basis of these rules the concept of fallacy is defined as Ŗevery violation of 
any of the rules of the discussion procedure for conducting a critical discussion (by 
whichever party and at whatever stage in the discussion)ŗ (van Eemeren & 
Grootendorst 2004:175). As stated before an argumentative process can be 
considered a form of strategic maneuvering aimed at resolving differences of opinion. 
In terms of strategic maneuvering argumentative moves Ŗare considered sound if 
they are in agreement with the rules for critical discussion. (…) All derailments of 
strategic maneuvering are fallacious and all fallacies can be regarded as derailments 
of strategic maneuveringŗ (van Eemeren & Houtlosser 2002: 141-142). Unlike 
traditional approaches which define fallacies as arguments that seem valid but that 
are not valid, pragma-dialectics gives a broader definition of fallacies as deficient 
moves in an argumentative discourse or text. It offers a normative model, a system 
of rules for the resolution of differences of opinion, fallacies being systematically 
analyzed as violations of these rules. In this way all those instances of fallacious 
argumentation which are not necessarily invalid are covered by the term fallacy. 
Another theory which I find relevant to my approach to the ethical discourse on 
abortion is Kinneavyřs Theory of Discourse (1971). The author identifies four types of 
discourse on the basis of the various uses language can be put to: reference, 
persuasive, literary and expressive. Persuasive discourse is defined as a type of 
person discourse which Ŗis primarily focused on the decoder and attempts to elicit 
from him a specific action or emotion or convictionŗ (Kinneavy 1971: 211). Since 
participants in an ethical dilemma try to bring the most persuasive arguments in 
favor of or against a certain standpoint we can say that one of the major functions or 
aims of ethical discourse is to persuade. Because of this prevalent persuasive 
component ethical discourse may be considered as a type of persuasive discourse by a 
relation of hyponymy. Therefore, ethical discourse Ŗinheritsŗ the formal and 
functional properties of persuasive discourse.  
The characteristics of persuasive discourse can be best put in evidence by 
comparison with other types of discourses such as reference, literary or expressive. 
As stated before the purpose of persuasion is to produce an effect upon the 
interlocutor/ hearer. In the case of the other types of discourse Ŗpersuasion of the 
decoder is indirect and secondary. It is in this sense that persuasion is decoder-
oriented discourse. And because of its indirect inducement to some kind of action 
(intellectual, emotional, or physical), it therefore differs from science and literature. 
Both of these latter have been called neutral or objectiveŗ (Kinneavy 1971: 219). 
As opposed to reference discourse the probability level of persuasion is lower. In 
other words persuasive discourse deals with Řwhat seems to be the caseř or Řwhat 
resembles the truthř. According to Kinneavy Ŗpersuasion has to do with the 
Řplausibleř, with apparent proof and seeming logic, and with image personality and 
the simulated virtues of styleŗ (Kinneavy 1971: 220). 
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Another important difference between persuasive discourse and reference 
discourse is the presence in persuasive discourse of emotional terms and references. 
The questions which arises here is whether it is moral to appeal to peopleřs emotions, 
to persuade them by rhetorical means. 
Moreover, persuasive discourse has a particular logic which resides in the 
methods of persuasion that is in the types of arguments used to persuade someone. 
These arguments are known as the ethical argument (encoder proof), the logical 
argument (reality proof), the pathetic argument (decoder proof). The last component 
of the logic of persuasion is rhetorical style. 
The ethical argument, also called the argument from authority or the argument 
from character represents the image the speaker projects. He has to be endowed with 
good sense (ability to take decisions, knowledge of the subject at issue), good will (to 
show good intentions towards the audience), good moral character (to project himself 
as sincere and trustworthy). 
Emotional or pathetical arguments are used to arouse emotions in the audience. 
The following types of emotions are discussed by Aristotle in his Rhetoric: anger, 
calmness, friendship and enmity, fear and confidence, shame and shamelessness, 
kindness and unkindness, pity, indignation, envy and emulation.  
The logical argument is the technique of Ŗinducing beliefŖ (Kinneavy 1971: 245). 
In other words the audience is persuaded by the appearance of rationality. According 
to Aristotle there are three types of logical arguments: topics, examples and 
enthymemes.  
Topics (Greek topoi) represent stereotyped arguments or a set of arguments to be 
used in any situation. Aristotle identifies special topics (specific to a certain science 
such as politics and ethics), common topics (applicable to any kind of subject) and 
enthymeme topics (used in rhetoric). Cicero defines topics as lines of arguments and 
subjects of discourse. The special topics are based on propositions about good and 
evil, justice and injustice, nobility and baseness, types of characters and emotions. 
ŖThe common topics are arguments deriving from the possible and the impossible, 
from past fact, from future fact, and from degrees of greatness and smallnessŗ 
(Kinneavy 1971: 246). The enthymeme topics are arguments from opposites, from 
correlative ideas, from cause and effect.  
In Classical Rhetoric for the Modern Student, Corbett (1971) makes a detailed 
classification of topics starting from the distinction between common and special 
topics on the one hand and between the three types of rhetorical activity Ŕ 
deliberative, judicial and ceremonial Ŕ on the other hand. In the case of deliberative 
discourse Ŗall our appeals can be reduced to these two heads: (1) the worthy or the 
good and (2) the advantageous or expedient or usefulŗ (Corbett, 1971: 146). As ethical 
discourse has to do with the problem of right and wrong generally, we can consider it 
a type of deliberative discourse. Therefore this special line of argumentation of 
showing the audience Ŗwhat is good in itselfŗ and Ŗwhat is good for usŗ will be used in 
ethical discourse. In addition to these special topics we can use some of the common 
topics such as: definition, comparison, relationship, circumstance, etc. 
According to Corbett the emphasis on the topic of the worthy or on the topic of 
the advantageous depends on the nature of the subject on the one hand and on the 
nature of the audience on the other hand. The concept of happiness is what 
determines us to choose or to avoid a certain course of action. ŖWhen we are engaged 
in any kind of deliberative discourse, we are seeking to convince someone to adopt a 
certain course of action because it is conducive to his happiness or to reject a certain 
course of action because it will lead to unhappinessŗ (Corbett 1971: 148).  
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Regarding the informative dimension of persuasive discourse according to 
Kinneavy Ŗfactsŗ in persuasive discourse Ŗare put to work to prove a specific thesis. 
The facts which could do a disservice to the cause must be either concealed or 
minimized, and facts which tend to support the cause must be magnifiedŗ (Kinneavy 
1971: 253).  
Style is a fundamental element of persuasion. As Kinneavy puts it each type of 
discourse has its own characteristic style which is highly determined by the function, 
nature, logic and organization of the discourse. Therefore we can speak about a 
characteristic style of persuasion. Other two factors that contribute to the specificity 
of a discursive style are the cultural context and the situational context.  
Paraphrasing Lasswell, Kinneavy upholds that an effective persuasive discourse 
has to be grounded on the current political myth. The concept of political myth is 
explained in terms of Ŗthe current underlying assumptions or explicit formulations of 
political theory, laws, and the popular manner in which these are realized in a state. 
There are, therefore, three basic elements to the myth: the doctrine, the formula, and 
the miranda, which might be translated as things believed, things legislated, and 
things admired.ŗ (Kinneavy 1971: 280). The three elements - doctrine, formula and 
miranda - contain key symbols that are relevant for a particular audience at a 
particular time. An effective persuader has to know how to make use of these 
elements in the proper situational context. 
As regards the semantic characteristics of persuasive discourse Kinneavy takes 
into account both Ŗsemantic differentialŗ and aspects related to Ŗthe theory of 
reference of semanticsŗ. With respect to semantic differential persuasive style is 
characterized by a tension between the ordinary use of language as a sign of clarity 
and the extraordinary use of language as indicative of dignity of style. If persuasive 
style is too ornamented, it becomes literary, if it is too ordinary, it does not attract 
the audienceřs attention to the speaker. So in both cases the persuasive effect can be 
lost. Therefore a balance between the two poles has to be kept by an effective 
persuader. In point of the semantic area of reference, persuasive style has some 
particularities as well. Kinneavy speaks about the concept of Ŗpersuasive clarityŗ 
which is quite different from clarity in scientific or informative terms. ŖOften the 
presentation of the issue in the light the speaker desires will necessitate a distortion 
of the real issue or a withholding of facts or a screened view of the reality. The 
clarity of persuasion is then a filtered clarity (…), but the hearer must think he has a 
clear picture of realityŗ (Kinneavy 1971: 286). 
Another characteristic of persuasive style is related to its vocabulary. As 
Kinneavy states, the vocabulary of persuasion is highly connotative the words 
referring to Ŗemotional associations, attitudes, affective and conative elementsŗ 
(Kinneavy 1971: 287). The vocabulary of persuasion is dominated by the same 
tension between Ŗthe ordinaryŗ and Ŗthe extraordinaryŗ. On the one hand speakers 
are advised by persuasion theorists to use concrete terms. On the other hand 
speakers use abstract terms such as good, love, patriotism, God, happiness, freedom, 
etc. Imagery plays a very important role in persuasion. By imagery some 
abstractions are rendered concrete. The presence of a great number of figures of 
speech such as simile, symbol, paradox, metaphor, euphemism, synecdoche, 
metonymy, hyperbole, etc. is another feature of persuasive discourse. Non literal 
language has not only an ornamental function but also an aesthetic function with a 
subtle psychological effect upon the reader/ listener. 
The relation between referring term and object referred represents another 
semantic characteristic of persuasive style. Many terms in rhetorical, propagandistic 
and ethical language are ambiguous and vague. The vocabulary of persuasion is a 
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very dynamic one. Shifts of meanings take place, a term may preserve its denotative 
meaning but its emotional connotations may be replaced or the emotional 
connotations of a term may remain the same but its denotative meaning changes.  
As concerns the grammatical characteristics of persuasive discourse, Kinneavy 
takes into consideration both sound level and sentence level. At the level of sound 
rhythm, rhyme, alliteration and other sound patterns are extremely effective in 
persuasion. Among the morphemic features of persuasive discourse a jargon of Ŕisms 
and alphabetical jargons have been noticed. As regards the syntactic level Ŗthe sum 
total of a persuasive discourse is an imperative sentence in aim and a narrative 
sentence in modeŗ (Kinneavy 1971: 293). This accounts for the presence of the 
addressee in the persuasive style. First person pronouns are specific to ethical 
arguments. 
These are in broad lines the distinguishing characteristics of persuasive 
discourse as approached by Kinneavy. As already stated ethical discourse can be 
considered a type of persuasive discourse by a relation of proximal genus and specific 
difference. Consequently, the specific features of the prototype Ŕ persuasive 
discourse Ŕ are inherited by the subtype Ŕ ethical discourse. Besides these specific 
properties a referential informative or an expressive component can be found in 
persuasive discourse and therefore in ethical discourse too. As Kinneavy notices 
discourses overlap in their aims, one of the aims being dominant the others being 
subordinate. Some ethical texts sound more like confessions or instances of diaries 
while others look like informative texts, the persuasive dimension being very subtle. 
 
 
2. Logos, ethos and pathos in the ethical argumentation on abortion - case 
study 
 
In what follows I will focus on the types of arguments used to defend or refute the 
standpoint abortion is / is not a crime in the process of ethical argumentation on 
abortion. This case study consists in applying the relevance rule (rule 4) for critical 
discussion to two argumentative texts in order to see if the balance between 
dialectics and rhetoric is maintained or if the arguments advanced are relevant to 
the standpoint at issue. I will try to reconstruct the argumentation stage of each of 
the two argumentative processes discussing the following aspects: arguments 
advanced, premises left unexpressed, types of argumentation scheme, kinds of 
criticism levelled and structure of argumentation as a whole. Special attention will 
be devoted to the fallacies specific to the argumentation stage of a critical discussion 
known as fallacies in choosing the means of defense. Therefore what I am interested 
in is the way the relevance rule is violated in these argumentative texts illustrating 
opposing positions on abortion: the philosophical perspective versus the religious 
perspective.  
Before discussing the dialectical and rhetorical aspects of the texts it is necessary 
to see what the relevance rule for critical discussion stipulates. According to rule 4 
Ŗstandpoints may not be defended by non-argumentation or argumentation that is 
not relevant to the standpointŗ (i.e. standpoints may not be defended only by 
rhetorical devices such as pathos or ethos, instead of logos, or by irrelevant 
arguments) (van Eemeren and Grootendorst, 2004: 192). There are two ways in 
which this rule can be violated: a standpoint may be defended by nonargumentative 
means of persuasion or by irrelevant argumentation. Why are these means of defense 
fallacious?  
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Using nonargumentative means of persuasion instead of rational arguments 
hinders the resolution of the dispute. These rhetorical techniques are aimed at a 
third party, the audience and less at convincing the opponent of the acceptability of 
the standpoint at issue. Thus, in defending his standpoint, the protagonist can play 
on the emotions or prejudices of the audience, or he can parade his own qualities by 
either presenting himself as an authority or as a layman trying in this way to win 
the audience over.  
In pragma-dialectical terms, the manipulation of the audienceřs emotions is 
known as the argumentum ad populum: emotional arguments (pathos) replace 
rational arguments (logos). This fallacy is frequently used where large groups of 
people are involved: public demonstrations, political meetings or religious 
gatherings. Parading oneřs own qualities is another nonargumentative means of 
persuasion aimed at winning the audience over. The protagonist commits an ethical 
fallacy known also as the argumentum ad verecundiam when he Ŗattempts to get a 
standpoint accepted by the audience just because of the authority he derives in the 
eyes of the audience from his expert knowledge, credibility, or integrityŗ (van 
Eemeren and Grootendorst, 1992: 135). In this case ethos or blind faith takes the 
place of rational arguments. Thus, a standpoint is accepted not because it has been 
defended in a rational way but because the audience trusts the authority of the 
protagonist. If the protagonist is indeed an authority with respect to the standpoint 
at issue and there is evidence for this, the appeal to ethos is not fallacious. Modestly 
presenting oneself as a layman in order to gain the sympathy and benevolence of the 
audience is another ethical fallacy known as the argumentum ad misericordiam.  
As stated before, besides nonargumentative means of persuasion, a standpoint 
may be defended by irrelevant argumentation. ŖThe fallacy of advancing 
argumentation that is only relevant to a standpoint that is not actually at issue is 
traditionally called ignoratio elenchi (van Eemeren and Grootendorst, 1992: 133). In 
this way a standpoint becomes easier to defend because the protagonist puts forward 
argumentation that is not related to the disputed standpoint.  
As concerns the use of logos one has to be aware that the protagonist or the 
antagonist can give their argumentation the appearance of logicality in order to 
defend their position more convincingly. Nevertheless, the logical quality of their 
arguments can be assessed by reconstructing the underlying reasoning of their 
argumentation. Therefore if the arguments employed to defend or refute a 
standpoint are invalid, fallacies may occur. The presence of fallacies at the 
argumentation stage of a critical discussion obstructs the resolution of a difference of 
opinion and therefore they should be avoided.  
Now I will turn to my case study of the ethical argumentation on abortion in 
order to see how dialectics and rhetoric combine, what types of fallacies can be found 
and what their role is in the process of argumentation. I will discuss each text 
fragment in turn focusing on the means chosen to defend the standpoint at issue.   
The first text to be analysed is an excerpt from an article by Judith Jarvis 
Thomson ŖA Defense of Abortionŗ (1971). In her article the philosopher pleads for the 
right to have an abortion starting from the premise that the fetus is not a human 
being from the moment of conception.  
Most opposition to abortion relies on the premise that the fetus is a human being, a person, 
from the moment of conception. (...) We are asked to notice that the development of a 
human being from conception through birth into childhood is continuous. Similar things 
might be said about the development of an acorn into an oak tree, and it does not follow 
that acorns are oak trees, (…). I think that the premise is false, that the fetus is not a 
person from the moment of conception. A newly fertilized ovum, a newly implanted clump 
of cells, is no more a person than an acorn is an oak tree. (…) I propose, then, that we 
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grant that the fetus is a person from the moment of conception. (...) Every person has a 
right to life. So the fetus has a right to life. No doubt the mother has a right to decide what 
shall happen in and to her body; everyone would grant that. But surely a person's right to 
life is stronger and more stringent than the mother's right to decide what happens in and 
to her body, and so outweighs it. So the fetus may not be killed; an abortion may not be 
performed. 
It sounds plausible, but now let me ask you to imagine this. You wake up in the morning 
and find yourself back to back in bed with an unconscious violinist. He has been found to 
have a fatal kidney ailment, and the Society of Music Lovers has canvassed all the 
available medical records and found that you alone have the right blood type to help. They 
have therefore kidnapped you, and last night the violinist's circulatory system was plugged 
into yours, so that your kidneys can be used to extract poisons from his blood as well as 
your own. The director of the hospital now tells you, ŖLook, we're sorry the Society of Music 
Lovers did this to youŕwe would never have permitted it if we had known. But still, they 
did it, and the violinist is now plugged into you. To unplug you would be to kill him. But 
never mind, it's only for nine months. By then he will have recovered from his ailment, and 
can safely be unplugged from you.ŗ Is it morally incumbent on you to accede to this 
situation? (…) All persons have a right to life, and violinists are persons. Granted you have 
a right to decide what happens in and to your body, but a person's right to life outweighs 
your right to decide what happens in and to your body. So you cannot ever be unplugged 
from him (...) 
Of the three means - logos, ethos and pathos - to defend her standpoint that 
abortion is not a crime, Thomson relies mostly on the appeal to reason (logos). She 
builds her argumentation in favour of abortion on the basis of the arguments 
advanced by the opposing party against abortion. Rhetorically, this strategy of 
adopting the opponentřs premises to support oneřs own position is called conciliatio 
and is considered one of the most effective persuasive techniques meant to drive the 
discussion in the direction wanted by the speaker. What the author attempts to 
demolish is the theory that the fetus may not be killed, in other words, an abortion 
may not be performed since the fetus is a human being, a person from the moment of 
conception. The first step in this attempt is to prove that Ŗthe fetus is not a human 
being from the moment of conceptionŗ.  
As shown in the text the argumentation against abortion is put forward by 
means of deductive reasoning and can be reconstructed in the form of the following 
syllogism: Every person has a right to life. The fetus is a person. So the fetus has a 
right to life. In this syllogism Every person has a right to life is the major premise 
while The fetus is a person is the minor premise. From these two premises the 
conclusion So the fetus has a right to life can be drawn. The question to be answered 
is whether this syllogism is valid or not.  
In pragma-dialectical terms Ŗfor a conclusive defense of a standpoint it is 
necessary for all the arguments used in the discourse to be logically valid. This 
validity requirement relates to the form of the arguments, which should be such that 
if the premises are true the conclusion of the argument cannot possibly be falseŗ (van 
Eemeren and Grootendorst, 1992: 169). In this sense, Rule 8 for critical discussion 
states: ŖIn his argumentation a party may only use arguments that are logically valid 
or capable of being validated by making explicit one or more unexpressed premisesŗ 
(van Eemeren and Grootendorst, 1992: 169). Of the two premises of this syllogism, 
Thomson attacks the minor one, The fetus is a person, as being false. So, if one of the 
premises of a syllogism is false, the whole chain of reasoning is not valid. Unlike the 
proposition Every person has a right to life which is treated as a universal truth, the 
proposition The fetus is a person is considered only probable and therefore it is a 
vulnerable spot in the chain of reasoning. J.J. Thomson suggests that such probable 
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premises or probable truths can be very persuasive and can sound plausible but at a 
closer check they are shaky.  
The main arguments she advances to refute the proposition The fetus is a person 
are the following: ŖWe are asked to notice that the development of a human being 
from conception through birth into childhood is continuous. Similar things might be 
said about the development of an acorn into an oak tree, and it does not follow that 
acorns are oak trees. (...) A newly fertilized ovum, a newly implanted clump of cells, is 
no more a person than an acorn is an oak treeŗ. Of the three main argumentative 
schemes Ŕ symptomatic argumentation, argumentation based on analogy and 
argumentation based on causality Ŕ the author employs the second type, 
argumentation based on analogy, as one can notice in the text. From a pragma-
dialectical perspective in this type of argumentation scheme Ŗthe acceptability of the 
premises is transferred to the conclusion by making it understood that there is a 
relation of analogy between what is stated in the argument and what is stated in the 
standpointŗ (van Eemeren and Grootendorst, 1992: 97). A relation of analogy may be 
expressed as ŖřX is comparable to Yř, ŘX corresponds to Yř and ŘX is just like Yřŗ (van 
Eemeren and Grootendorst, 1992: 99). In our case, the argumentation put forward by 
the author is of the type ŖX is comparable to Yŗ: the development of a human being is 
comparable or similar to the development of an acorn.  
In rhetorical terms this argumentation scheme corresponds to the common topic 
of comparison with its three subtypes: similarity, difference and degree. As Corbett  
explains Ŗsimilarity is the basic principle behind all inductive argument and all 
analogy. In induction, we note similarity among a number of instances and make an 
inference about a further unobserved or unconfirmed instanceŗ (1971: 116). Thomson 
argues that in both chains of reasoning  the equivalence between an acorn and an 
oak tree and the equivalence between a newly fertilized ovum, a newly implanted 
clump of cells and a person are false.  On the basis of the similarity that she finds 
between the two cases, the author tries to convince the audience that the previously 
reconstructed syllogism is invalid and implicitly that if the fetus is not a person, he 
does not have a right to life and so an abortion may be performed. In other words, by 
means of inductive reasoning J.J. Thomson draws a general conclusion from a single 
instance of similarity.  
The second step in the protagonistřs argumentation is to clarify the motherřs 
rights. Thomson employs the same strategy of pretending to accept the antagonistřs 
arguments as plausible in order to refute them one by one and thus prove the 
soundness of her standpoint. In the same line with the chain of reasoning regarding 
the rights of the fetus here are the arguments concerning the rights of the mother: 
ŖNo doubt the mother has a right to decide what shall happen in and to her body; 
everyone would grant that. But surely a person's right to life is stronger and more 
stringent than the mother's right to decide what happens in and to her body, and so 
outweighs it. So the fetus may not be killed; an abortion may not be performedŗ. On 
the basis of this reasoning opponents of abortion conclude that the fetus may not be 
killed, therefore an abortion may not be performed since the fetusřright to life 
overweighs the motherřs right to decide what hapens in and to her body. What 
Thomson attacks in this case is the premise that Ŗa personřs right to life is stronger 
and more stringent than the motherřs right to decide what happens in and to her 
bodyŗ.  
In support of the refutation of this premise and in order to make her 
argumentation even more persuasive the protagonist provides the reader / imaginary 
audience with a scenario that is supposed to prove the validity of her standpoint. 
Thus, the reader is asked to imagine that for nine months a famous violonist 
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suffering from a fatal kidney ailment is plugged into his / her body and his / her 
kidneys function for both. To be unplugged from the violonist would be to kill him 
which is immoral. So, even if the reader has the right to decide what happens in and 
to his / her body, he / she cannot be unplugged from the vilonist. This scenario is 
meant to be analogous with the pregnancy period that a woman has to go through 
against her will. By analogy with the previously discussed syllogism Thomson builds 
the following chain of reasoning: All persons have a right to life. Violonists are 
persons. So vilonists have a right to life. On the basis of this syllogism one can infer 
that as violonists have a right to life, they cannot be killed, which is a conclusion 
similar to The fetus may not be killed as The fetus has a right to life as well. At first 
glance this analogy between the vilonist plugged into his host and the fetus plugged 
into his motherřs body is given the appearance of logicality because the author 
presents the two situations as perfectly similar.  
However, at a closer examination of the logical quality of Thomsonřs 
argumentation a reasonable critic may detect some flaws. Pragma-dialectics offers a 
set of evaluative questions relevant to the argumentation based on analogy: ŖIs the 
situation to which the present case is compared indeed correctly described? Does it 
really resemble the present case? Or are there crucial differences between them? Are 
there perhaps other situations that better resemble the present case?ŗ (van Eemeren 
and Grootendorst, 1992: 102). By adapting these critical reactions to our case, we can 
derive the following questions: Is the development of a newly fertilized ovum into a 
person similar to the development of an acorn into an oak tree?, Does the famous 
violonist scenario resemble the pregnancy period case? Or are there major 
differences between them? Moreover, from a rhetorical perspective analogies are 
considered vulnerable Ŗwhen they concentrate on irrelevant, inconsequential 
similarities between two situations and overlook pertinent, significant 
dissimilarities. (...) an analogy never proves anything; at best, it persuades someone 
on the grounds of probability. It is the degree of probability that will be susceptible 
to challengeŗ (Corbett, 1971: 90).  
On the basis of this evaluation test the following deficiencies have been identified 
in Thomsonřs argumentation. In spite of their apparent perfect similarity there are 
significant dissimilarities between the terms compared in the analogies the author 
makes between a fetus and an acorn and between the violonist scenario and the 
pregnancy period. Thus, both a fetus and an acorn can be viewed as the Ŗproductsŗ of 
some sort of conception but they are different species with different stages of 
development into a person and into an oak tree, respectively. Moreover, in order to 
develop into a person, a fetus needs a Ŗhostŗ to carry him / her for nine months while 
an acorn does not need such a host in order to become an oak tree. Given these 
differences there are more chances for a fetus to become a person than for an acorn 
to become an oak tree.  
As regards the second analogy some dissimilarities between the violonist scenario 
and the pregnancy period may be pointed out. First of all, the violonist is already a 
fully developed person when connected to his host while the fetus is just in an early 
stage of development into a person. Secondly, the vilonist is an external Ŗelementŗ 
plugged into his host without the latterřs consent while the fetus is an Ŗinternalŗ 
element, a product of conception which is not plugged into the motherřs body. Put 
simply, when having a sexual contact the mother indirectly gives her consent to 
becoming a Ŗhostŗ for a possible pregnancy. If the violonist has just a physical 
connection to the host, the fetus is more than physically connected to the mother. 
Thirdly, at the end of the nine months the violonist is unplugged from the hostřs 
body and is no longer in need of it while the fetus is separated from his motherřs 
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body but is still dependent on her. Therefore, in her argumentation Thomson 
commits the fallacy of false analogy defined in pragma-dialectical terms as a 
defective comparison in which the argument from analogy is used incorrectly. This 
fallacy is a violation of rule 7 for a critical discussion which requires: A party may 
not regard a standpoint as conclusively defended if the defense does not take place by 
means of an appropriate argumentation scheme that is correctly used (van Eemeren 
and Grootendorst, 1992: 159). 
Taking into account all these possible critical reactions we can conclude that 
Thomsonřs argumentation is fallacious in the sense that it does not succede in 
refuting the opposing standpoint in a reasonable way. She makes use of the 
argumentative scheme based on analogy in order to create an impression of logicality 
which can persuade but which cannot convince the audience.  
 The second text that I am going to discuss is an excerpt from John Paul IIřs The 
Gospel of Life / Evangelium Vitae (1995) which illustrates the religious perspective 
on abortion as an Ŗunspeakable crimeŗ. 
The moral gravity of procured abortion is apparent in all its truth if we recognize that we 
are dealing with murder and, in particular, when we consider the specific elements 
involved. The one eliminated is a human being at the very beginning of life. No one more 
absolutely innocent could be imagined. In no way could this human being ever be 
considered an aggressor, much less an unjust aggressor! He or she is weak, defenceless, 
even to the point of lacking that minimal form of defence consisting in the poignant power 
of a newborn baby's cries and tears. The unborn child is totally entrusted to the protection 
and care of the woman carrying him or her in the womb.  
It is true that the decision to have an abortion is often tragic and painful for the mother, 
insofar as the decision to rid herself of the fruit of conception is not made for purely selfish 
reasons or out of convenience, but out of a desire to protect certain important values such 
as her own health or a decent standard of living for the other members of the family. 
Sometimes it is feared that the child to be born would live in such conditions that it would 
be better if the birth did not take place. Nevertheless, these reasons and others like them, 
however serious and tragic, can never justify the deliberate killing of an innocent human 
being. (...) 
Some people try to justify abortion by claiming that the result of conception, at least up to 
a certain number of days, cannot yet be considered a personal human life. But in fact, 
"from the time that the ovum is fertilized, a life is begun which is neither that of the father 
nor the mother; it is rather the life of a new human being with his own growth. It would 
never be made human if it were not human alreadyŗ. This has always been clear, and. . . 
modern genetic science offers clear confirmation.  
(...) The human being is to be respected and treated as a person from the moment of 
conception; and therefore from that same moment his rights as a person must be 
recognized, among which in the first place is the inviolable right of every innocent human 
being to life". Human life is sacred and inviolable at every moment of existence, including 
the initial phase which precedes birth. All human beings, from their mothers' womb, 
belong to God (...) as many passages of the Bible bear witness--they are the personal 
objects of God's loving and fatherly providence. 
(...) I declare that direct abortion, that is, abortion willed as an end or as a means, always 
constitutes a grave moral disorder, since it is the deliberate killing of an innocent human 
being. This doctrine is based upon the natural law and upon the written Word of God, is 
transmitted by the Church's Tradition and taught by the ordinary and universal 
Magisterium. 
No circumstance, no purpose, no law whatsoever can ever make licit an act which is 
intrinsically illicit, since it is contrary to the Law of God which is written in every human 
heart, knowable by reason itself, and proclaimed by the Church.. 
Of the three means Ŕ logos, ethos and pathos Ŕ to defend his standpoint that 
abortion is a crime, Pope John Paul II resorts mainly to pathetical and ethical 
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arguments. The premise The fetus is a person that was attacked by Thomson is now 
considered as a self-evident truth on the basis of which abortion as murder is 
Ŗapparent in all its truthŗ. Abortion is made to appear even fiercer as Ŗthe one 
eliminatedŗ is innocent, weak, defenceless and totally dependent on his / her mother. 
So, the use of these adjectives is meant to stir pity for the unborn child on the one 
hand and revolt against abortion supporters on the other hand. Empathizing with 
the audience is another form of emotional appeal. The Pope claims to be aware of the 
reasons a woman may have to end her pregnancy as well as of the difficulty in 
taking the decision to have an abortion: ŖIt is true that the decision to have an 
abortion is often tragic and painful for the mother (...).ŗ This attitude creates at first 
sight a feeling of comfort and of hope for a mother that such a situation can be 
avoided in the future. However, no matter the circumstances or the reasons 
conducive to abortion may be, the deliberate killing of a human being cannot be 
justified: ŖNevertheless, these reasons and others like them, however serious and 
tragic, can never justify the deliberate killing of an innocent human beingŗ. These 
words exploit negative feelings such as guilt or fear of punishment. Since emotions 
(pathos) replace rational arguments (logos), we are dealing with an ad populum 
fallacy. Thus, the protagonist uses nonargumentative means of persuasion which is a 
violation of rule 4 for critical discussion.  
Like in Thomsonřs case, the protagonist builds his argumentation on the basis of 
the arguments advanced by the opposing party: ŖSome people try to justify abortion 
by claiming that the result of conception, at least up to a certain number of days, 
cannot yet be considered a personal human life. But in fact, Řfrom the time that the 
ovum is fertilized, a life is begun which is neither that of the father nor the mother; it 
is rather the life of a new human being with his own growth. It would never be made 
human if it were not human alreadyř. This has always been clear, and modern genetic 
science offers clear confirmationŗ. As we can see, in refuting the proposition The fetus 
is not a person from the moment of conception the protagonist appeals also to the 
authority of modern genetic science in order to sound more credible to the audience. 
This is a very persuasive rhetorical ruse based on the principle that in general 
people have faith in scientifically proved facts.  
The protagonist relies on the appeal to logos in the chains of reasoning by which 
he tries to show why the fetus cannot be killed. The following syllogisms can be 
reconstructed on the basis of the text: 1) Every human being is a person from the 
moment of conception. The fetus is a human being. So the fetus is a person from the 
moment of conception. 2) Every person has the inviolable right to life. The fetus is a 
person. So the fetus has the inviolable right to life. 3) Human life is sacred and 
inviolable. The fetus is a human life. So the fetus is sacred and inviolable. 4) All 
human beings belong to God. The fetus is a human being. The fetus belongs to God. 5) 
Every person belonging to God cannot be killed. The fetus is a person. So the fetus 
cannot be killed. In all these syllogisms the minor premise represents the vulnerable 
spot which can be refuted. So, as we have seen in Thomsonřs article opponents of 
abortion take the premise The fetus is a human being to be false. As regards the fifth 
chain of reasoning that we have reconstructed it can be considered a tenable 
argument only if a religious perspective upon life as something which belongs to God 
and not to human beings is adopted. In other words this type of reasoning is 
appealing to a particular kind of audience that takes as self-evident the premises All 
human beings belong to God and Every person belonging to God cannot be killed. 
The most effective means of persuasion used by the protagonist is the appeal to 
ethos. Pope John Paul II neither emphasizes his expertise nor exaggerates his 
modesty in order to get his standpoint accepted by the audience. Still, he can win the 
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audience over by the authority he projects. A religious audience would accept his 
standpoint because they have faith in his authority as the supreme representative of 
God. To put it simply, blind faith would replace rational considerations. Therefore, 
the protagonist may be considered guilty of the ad verecundiam fallacy unless it is 
admitted that he really is an authority with respect to the standpoint at issue. 
Besides this subtle use of ethos, the protagonist appeals to other forms of authority 
such as the Bible, the natural law, the written Word of God, the Churchřs Tradition, 
the ordinary and universal Magisterium and the Law of God which are meant to 
determine the audience to accept his standpoint. Of great persuasive force is also the 
declarative speech act used by the Pope to condemn abortion from a position of 
authority:  I declare that direct abortion (...)  is the deliberate killing of an innocent 
human being. (...) No circumstance, no purpose, no law whatsoever can ever make 
licit an act which is intrinsically illicit, since it is contrary to the Law of God which is 
written in every human heart, knowable by reason itself, and proclaimed by the 
Church. Thus, by this declarative which can be accepted only if performed by an 
authority acknowledged as such, the protagonist guarantees the rightness of his 
standpoint. The argumentation ends with a mixture of the three appeals Ŕ pathos, 
logos and ethos Ŕ meant to refute any opposition to the protagonistřs position.  
The Popeřs argumentation is richer in rhetorical devices than Thomsonřs. The 
vocabulary is highly emotional combining concrete and abstract terms. The whole 
excerpt can be reduced to the topic of the worthy, of what is good to be pursued. The 
protagonist tries to convince the audience to reject abortion as a path conducive to 
their unhappiness. Taking all these aspects into consideration we can draw the 
conclusion that in John Paul IIřs argumentation rhetoric overweighs dialectics and 
the two types of fallacies identified Ŕ ethical and pathetical Ŕ function as winning 
strategies.  
 
 
Conclusions  
 
In this case study I have tried to reconstruct the argumentation stage of an ethical 
controversy over abortion focusing on the types of arguments advanced by the two 
parties to defend their positions. Analysing the two argumentative texts illustrating 
opposing positions on abortion we have noticed that the balance between dialectics 
and rhetoric is not maintained. In spite of the logicality impression that the two 
texts give, we have identified a number of flaws in the process of argumentation. The 
violation of rule 4 and rule 7 results in two types of fallacies: fallacies in choosing the 
means of defense (ethical and pathetical fallacies) and fallacies in utilizing 
argumentation schemes (the fallacy of false analogy). The two instances of ethical 
argumentation are very persuasive but they do not commit to the critical standards 
of reasonableness. 
 
 
Note  
 
Part of this study has been developed in the framework of the SMADEM Project PN II Ŕ PCE Ŕ 
ID 1209 / 185 / 2007 at ŖDunărea de Josŗ University, Galaţi.  
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